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DENYING DISGORGEMENT:  
THE SUPREME COURT’S REFUSAL TO 
GRANT THE CROW TRIBE RELIEF 
ALEX GALLIANI* 
Abstract: In Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the United States Supreme Court 
declined to award the Crow Tribe of Indians disgorgement of coal taxes collected 
by Montana from a mining company with operations on the Tribe’s reservation. 
The Supreme Court justified its decision by distinguishing the 1939 Montana Su-
preme Court case Valley County v. Thomas, referencing the precedent set by Cot-
ton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, and noting that the Tribe lacked the neces-
sary approval to tax from the Department of the Interior. This Comment argues 
that the Supreme Court should have granted the Tribe full disgorgement, partial 
disgorgement, or compensatory damages. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Crow Tribe of Indians (“Tribe”) has lived on the land that is now di-
vided between southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming for at least 
300 years.1 Once as large as thirty-eight million acres, the Tribe’s reservation 
land has shrunk through a series of cessions to the federal government, and 
today spans 2.3 million acres in Montana.2 For decades, the Tribe has strug-
gled with poverty; in 2000, the employment rate among Tribe adults was a 
mere fifty one percent.3 Although the Tribe’s reservation sits on one of the 
largest coal reserves in the country, disproportionately high regulatory over-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 Brief for the United States at 1, Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998) (No. 
96-1829), 1998 WL 28075; see INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 595 (Charles A. Kappler ed., 
1904). 
 2 Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Mont. 1985); JOSEPH P. 
KALT, THE MINING OF CROW NATION COAL: ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE CROW RESERVATION, BIG 
HORN COUNTY, AND MONTANA 4 (2014); James R. Bellis, Comment, Crow Tribe v. Montana: New 
Limits on State Intrusion into Reservation Rights, New Lessons for State and Tribal Cooperation, 50 
MONT. L.R. 133, 134–35, 136 n.14 (1989). Although purportedly the result of arms-length negotia-
tions, the cessions were likely a result of pressure by the federal government as part of a now-defunct 
national policy to abolish Indian reservations. Bellis, supra note 2, at 135 n.8; see infra notes 14–15 
and accompanying text. 
 3 KALT, supra note 2, at 4; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION GROUP: CROW ALONE (C83-
C86), https://www.census.gov/aian/census_2000/census_2000_data_for_539_tribes.html  [https://
perma.cc/ACL6-3UEC] (to generate this information set table as “Selected Social Characteristics,” 
select “Crow” for tribe, then click “Go”). 
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sight and permitting requirements control mining of reservation coal, resulting 
in additional complexity at every stage of the mining process.4 
In 1972, the Tribe entered into a lease with Westmoreland Resources, Inc. 
(“Westmoreland”), a non-Indian mining company.5 The lease enabled West-
moreland to mine coal beneath an area of the reservation held in trust for the 
Tribe by the federal government (“the Strip”), in return for royalties paid by 
Westmoreland to the Tribe.6 A dispute between the Tribe, Westmoreland, and 
Montana over taxation rights stemming from the lease led to nearly 20 years of 
litigation.7 
 In 1975, Montana imposed statewide taxes on coal mining, which applied 
to Westmoreland’s operations on the Strip.8 Shortly thereafter, the Tribe at-
tempted to pass its own tax on Westmoreland’s activities, but the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior (“DOI”) denied the Tribe’s tax.9 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that federal law preempted Montana’s 
taxes, and so the Tribe was due the taxes Westmoreland would have paid to 
Montana after 1983.10 The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed 
that decision and awarded the Tribe the post-1982 taxes.11 However in 1998, in 
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Supreme Court denied the Tribe’s claim 
                                                                                                                           
 4 KALT, supra note 2, at 2; William A. White, The Industry Perspective: The Pros and Cons of 
Mineral Development in Indian County, 1988 NAT. RES. DEV. INDIAN COUNTRY 1, 2; Terry L. An-
derson & Shawn Regan, The War on Coal Is Punishing Indian Country: Washington Rules Prevent 
Tribes Across the West from Developing Resources That Could Lift Them Out of Poverty, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 13, 2013, 7:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304906704579111030
189700024 [https://perma.cc/JA4U-TW5Y]. The Crow Tribe’s reservation coal reserves were valued 
at $3.3 million per capita in 1995, but the Tribe earns just a 0.01% annual rate of return. Terry L. 
Anderson, How the Government Keeps Indians in Poverty, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. (Nov. 22, 
1995), http://www.perc.org/articles/how-government-keeps-indians-poverty [https://perma.cc/P2LW-
7BCT]. 
 5 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians (Crow Tribe), 523 U.S. 696, 701 (1998). 
 6 Id.; see infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 7 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 719 (holding that the Tribe was not entitled to the taxes collected by 
Montana post-1982); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997, 997 (1988) (mem.) (summari-
ly affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to award the Tribe the taxes collected by Montana pre-1983); 
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow IV), 92 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (awarding the Tribe 
the taxes held by Montana post-1982); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow III), 969 F.2d 848, 
849 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to grant Montana’s motion to dismiss the Tribe’s claim to the post-1982 
taxes); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow II), 819 F.2d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that 
Montana’s taxes were preempted by federal law, and that the Tribe was entitled to the taxes collected 
by Montana pre-1983); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow I), 650 F.2d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 
1981) (declining to grant Montana’s motion to dismiss the Tribe’s claim to the pre-1983 taxes). For 
consistency, this Comment describes this case’s complicated procedural history using the same short 
citation case names as appear in the final United States Supreme Court decision. See Crow Tribe, 523 
U.S. at 704, 706, 708, 712. 
 8 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 702; see infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 9 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 702–03; see infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 10 Crow II, 819 F.2d at 899 n.2; see infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text. 
 11 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. at 997. 
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to full disgorgement of the pre-1983 taxes paid by Westmoreland to Mon-
tana.12 This Comment argues that given the Court’s previous award of the post-
1982 taxes and the underlying federal policy favoring economic development, 
the Supreme Court should have granted the Tribe full disgorgement, partial 
disgorgement, or compensatory damages.13 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal gov-
ernment controlled Indian property rights through an allotment program, which 
awarded parcels to individual Indians rather than to tribes collectively.14 By 
discouraging communal ownership of land by Indians, the allotment program 
was designed to assimilate Indians into mainstream culture and open land to 
white settlers.15 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”) represented 
the federal government’s repudiation of allotment.16 Congress effectuated the 
IRA as a general scheme, which was complemented in the specific context of 
mining through the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (“IMLA”).17 The IM-
LA expressly granted tribes the authority to execute mineral leases with non-
Indian lessees, subject to approval by the DOI.18 By granting tribes control 
over mineral leases, Congress sought to revitalize tribal self-government.19 
And by removing the technical requirements and complicated procedures that 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 719; see infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 103–129 and accompanying text. 
 14 See, e.g., Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1121–22 (D.D.C. 1976) (describing the federal 
allotment program); Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (1996) (describing allotment programs, specifically the Dawes Act of 
1887). 
 15 See, e.g., Gould, supra note 14, at 811–12 (noting that the federal government pursued allot-
ment as a mechanism to assimilate “tribal Indians into mainstream culture”); Mark D. Poindexter, 
Note, Of Dinosaurs and Indefinite Land Trusts: A Review of Individual American Indian Property 
Rights Amidst the Legacy of Allotment, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 53, 54 (1994) (noting that the 
federal government pursued allotment as a mechanism to “create more assimilation of the individual 
American Indian into the ‘dominant’ culture”). 
 16 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012). The IRA ended allotment by declaring that, “no land of any Indian 
reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive 
order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.” Id. See generally Judith 
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 
712 (1989) (discussing other aspects of the IRA, including model constitutions offered to Tribes by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs). 
 17 Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1112–13. 
 18 25 U.S.C. § 396a (“[U]n-allotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any 
tribe . . . may . . . be leased for mining purposes . . . for terms not to exceed ten years and as long 
thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.”). 
 19 Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1112. During the allotment period, the federal government largely con-
trolled mining leases without Indian consent. Id. at 1112 n.11. 
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previously deprived Indians of considerable revenue, Congress encouraged 
tribal economic development.20 
In 1904, the Tribe ceded the Strip, approximately 1,137,500 acres of res-
ervation land, to the United States.21 Although the federal government con-
veyed the surface land on the Strip to non-Indian homesteaders, it retained the 
subsurface mineral rights in trust for the Tribe.22 In 1972, the Tribe entered 
into a coal-mining lease with Westmoreland for coal underneath the Strip.23 In 
1975, Montana imposed both a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all 
coal produced statewide, including Westmoreland’s activities on the Strip.24 
Six months later, the Tribe set forth its own tax on any coal mined within the 
boundaries of the reservation, imposing an additional tax on Westmoreland.25 
Under the Tribe’s own constitution, any proposed taxes required approval by 
the DOI.26 Based on its interpretation of the Tribe’s constitution, the DOI ap-
proved the Tribe’s tax as applied to coal under the reservation, but “disap-
proved the tax to the extent that it applied to the Crow Tribe’s coal in [the 
Strip].”27 
A. Crow I: The Tribe Brings Suit for Disgorgement of the Post-1982 Taxes 
Collected by Montana 
In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action against Montana, seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the State’s taxes.28 The Tribe argued that 
the Montana state taxes were preempted by the IMLA.29 Montana moved to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the 
United States District Court for the District of Montana granted the State’s mo-
tion.30 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the District Court’s decision and held that if proved, the Tribe’s allega-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. at 1112–13. 
 21 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 700 (1998); see supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 22 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 700; Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107. 
 23 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 701. At the time, the Tribe received royalties that were some of the 
highest in the nation. Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573, 587 (D. Mont. 1985). 
Through October 1983, the Tribe had received approximately $17,877,126 in royalties. Id. at 588. 
 24 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 702; Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107–08. Because Westmoreland was en-
gaged in surface mining of high-quality coal, it was required to pay the highest severance tax rate. 
Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107; White, supra note 4, at 8. The Crow Tribe submitted evidence that the ef-
fective rate of Montana’s taxes was roughly thirty-three percent, whereas Montana stated that the 
effective rate was between twenty-one and twenty-two percent. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 899 n.2. 
 25 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 702–03. The Tribe’s severance tax was equal to twenty-five percent of 
the value of coal mined by the Tribe’s lessees. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107–08. 
 26 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 703. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 704. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
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tions could show that Montana’s taxes were preempted for conflicting with the 
IMLA.31 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the District Court, but before 
further proceedings to determine whether Montana’s taxes were actually 
preempted, the Tribe and Westmoreland together filed a motion for West-
moreland to deposit severance tax payments into the District Court’s registry.32 
The motion requested that rather than Westmoreland pay the taxes to Montana, 
the court hold the severance tax payments until the dispute regarding Mon-
tana’s ability to tax the Strip was resolved.33 In 1983, the District Court grant-
ed the motion, and Westmoreland thereafter paid taxes into the court’s regis-
try.34 
B. Crow II: The Ninth Circuit Awards the Tribe the Pre-1983 Taxes 
The trial to determine whether the Tribe was entitled to the post-1982 tax-
es began in 1984.35 The District Court held that Montana’s taxes were not 
preempted by the IMLA, but the Ninth Circuit again reversed.36 The Ninth 
Circuit explained that the proper inquiry was whether the Tribe could demon-
strate that Montana’s taxes interfered with the policies underlying the IMLA, 
and if so, Montana’s taxes would be preempted unless the State’s interests 
nonetheless justified the assessment of the taxes.37 The court reasoned that this 
preemption analysis should be colored by Congress’s “firm federal policy of 
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.”38 
The Ninth Circuit first determined that because the State’s taxes had a 
negative impact on the coal’s marketability, the taxes interfered with tribal and 
therefore federal interests.39 The court then reviewed the legitimacy of Mon-
tana’s interest in taxing Westmoreland, focusing on the relationship between 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1115. 
 32 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 705. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. In 1987, the District Court also allowed Westmoreland to pay the gross proceeds tax into 
the court’s registry. Id. 
 35 Id. at 706. Before court proceedings began, the United States intervened on the Tribe’s behalf 
as trustee of the coal taxed by Montana. Id. at 705–06. 
 36 Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898–903; Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 657 F. Supp. at 591–94. 
 37 Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898, 900. 
 38 Id. at 898; Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1108–09. 
 39 Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898–900. An economic research firm produced a report that showed Mon-
tana’s coal tax drove buyers to Wyoming. Id. at 899. Before the taxes were imposed in 1975, Montana 
produced 40.6% of Northern Great Plains coal, while Wyoming produced 43.8%. Id. In each subse-
quent year, Montana lost as Wyoming gained, to the point that in 1982 Montana produced 18.2% 
while Wyoming produced 69.5%. Id. Although Montana argued that the change was the result of 
supply and demand theory, the court found that the taxes imposed was the component that differed the 
most between Montana and Wyoming. Id. 
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the taxes and the furtherance of those interests.40 Montana argued that the addi-
tional government services required by the activity of mining itself, as well as 
the costs of rectifying pollution from the mining, justified assessment of the 
taxes.41 Assuming arguendo the legitimacy of Montana’s interests, the Ninth 
Circuit explained that the coal taxes must still be narrowly tailored to support 
those interests.42 Because the court found that the state’s taxes were excessive-
ly high and beyond a rate necessary to serve its proffered interests, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Montana’s taxes were preempted.43 Upon Montana’s appeal, 
the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion.44 
Following the Supreme Court’s summary affirmation in 1988, the Tribe 
sought an order directing the release of the post-1982 taxes from the District 
Court’s registry.45 Montana did not object to the release of funds, but West-
moreland did.46 Westmoreland argued that neither Montana nor the Tribe were 
entitled to the funds in the District Court’s registry, and so the funds were due 
back to Westmoreland.47 Under that theory, Montana could not receive the 
post-1982 taxes because the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the State’s taxes were 
preempted.48 And the Tribe was also ineligible to receive the funds because it 
lacked proper approval by the DOI to tax.49 The District Court rejected West-
moreland’s arguments and awarded the post-1982 taxes to the Tribe.50 The Dis-
trict Court explained that Westmoreland’s argument against the Tribe failed, 
because the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning implied that the tax approved by the DOI 
for the “reservation proper” also covered the Strip, and the DOI erred in decid-
ing otherwise.51 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. at 900. 
 41 Id. In Crow I, the court described this as the phenomenon of an “energy boomtown,” wherein 
large mining projects in rural areas require infrastructure such as roads and utilities. Crow I, 650 F.2d 
at 1114. 
 42 Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901. 
 43 See id. at 901–02. The court found that fifty percent of all revenues Montana collected from the 
severance tax statute were allocated to a state permanent trust fund. Id. at 901. Between nineteen per-
cent and thirty percent of payments from the severance tax went to the state general fund. Id. Neither 
use was dedicated to either mining or environmental purposes. Id. 
 44 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. at 997; see Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 714 n.14 
(quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784–85 n.5 (1983)) (“A summary disposition affirms 
only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to 
sustain the judgment.”). 
 45 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 706; see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 46 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 706. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.; see supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 49 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 706; see supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 50 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at.706–07. 
 51 Id; see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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C. Crow III: The Tribe Brings Suit for Disgorgement of the Pre-1983 Taxes 
Collected By Montana 
By this point in time, the Tribe had won the post-1982 taxes paid by 
Westmoreland.52 The Tribe then filed a complaint against Montana to separate-
ly obtain the taxes paid directly by Westmoreland to Montana between 1975, 
when the Montana’s coal mining tax took effect, and 1982, when West-
moreland began paying into the District Court’s registry.53 The Tribe argued 
that because Crow II established that Montana had illegally collected taxes 
from Westmoreland between 1972 and 1982,  it would be unjust to allow the 
State to retain the pre-1983 taxes.54 Montana moved for a summary judgment 
based on a lack of privity between the Tribe and the State, but the District 
Court denied Montana’s motion, and the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the 
State’s appeal.55 
D. Crow IV: The Ninth Circuit Awards the Tribe the Post-1982 Taxes 
The full trial to determine whether the Tribe was entitled to disgorgement 
of the pre-1983 taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana commenced in 
1994.56 The District Court found that because Westmoreland, not the Tribe, 
had paid the taxes to Montana, the Tribe lacked privity to recover the taxes 
from Montana.57 The District Court further emphasized that Montana, not the 
Tribe, had provided infrastructure on the Strip.58 Finally the District Court rea-
soned that because the Tribe lacked DOI approval to tax Westmoreland, the 
Tribe never would have collected taxes from Westmoreland, even if Montana 
had not taxed Westmoreland.59 Therefore the District Court denied the Tribe’s 
claim to full disgorgement.60 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed the District Court, and fully 
disgorged the pre-1983 taxes to the Tribe.61 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
taken together, its holdings in Crow II and Crow III mandated full disgorge-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at.707. 
 53 See id. Between 1976 and 1982 Montana collected more than fifty-eight million dollars from 
Westmoreland. Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 708–09; Crow III, 969 F.2d at 848–49. Montana argued that any right to a refund of the 
taxes collected belonged to Westmoreland, as the entity that paid the taxes, and not the Tribe. Crow 
Tribe, 523 U.S. at 708. 
 56 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 709. 
 57 Crow IV, 92 F.3d at 828–29. 
 58 Id. at 829–30; see supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 59 Crow IV, 92 F.3d at 830. 
 60 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 711. 
 61 Crow IV, 92 F.3d at 830. 
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ment.62 In contrast to the District Court’s findings, Crow III dismissed the priv-
ity requirement, Crow II found that the services provided by Montana could 
not justify its tax, and Crow II awarded the post-1982 taxes to the Tribe despite 
the lack of DOI approval.63 Montana appealed, and the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.64 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Montana Supreme Court decided Valley County v. Thomas in 1939, 
holding that one county was entitled to the full disgorgement of fees unlawful-
ly collected by another county.65 The counties disputed the proper interpreta-
tion of a Montana statute that required owners of motor vehicles to obtain li-
censes and pay applicable fees in the county where the cars were “owned or 
taxable.”66 The vehicle owners in question applied for the licenses and paid 
fees in McCone County, where they worked and parked their cars for eight 
hours daily.67 The vehicle owners lived in the Fort Peck townsite, the construc-
tion headquarters of a federal dam building project.68 Both parties agreed that 
the Fort Peck townsite was not part of McCone County.69 McCone County 
argued that because the federal government developed the dam building pro-
ject, the townsite was not part of adjacent Valley County either, so that Valley 
County had no monopoly on the issuing of licenses to Fort Peck residents, and 
could not enjoin McCone County from doing so.70 The Montana Supreme Court 
held that Montana never relinquished sovereignty over the Fort Peck townsite to 
the federal government, and therefore the townsite remained part of Valley 
County.71 
Even though the Fort Peck townsite was part of Valley County, McCone 
County argued that Valley County could not recover the money because there 
was no privity between the counties.72 McCone County asserted that only the 
vehicle owners had privity and could sue McCone County for illegal exaction, 
and so the appropriate remedy for Valley County was to issue a new tax upon 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. at 828–30. The Ninth Circuit said, “[i]n the process of weighing the equities in favor of 
and against restitution . . . [n]early every factor relied upon by the district court . . . is either contra-
dicted or made irrelevant by our earlier holdings.” Id. 
 63 Id. at 828–831. 
 64 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 713. 
 65 See Valley Cty. v. Thomas, 97 P.2d 345, 364, 367 (Mont. 1939). 
 66 Id. at 349. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at 349, 353. 
 69 Id. at 351. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 364. 
 72 Id. at 366. 
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vehicle owners.73 The court rejected McCone County’s solution as “clearly 
inequitable and burdensome.”74 Because McCone County had no right to col-
lect the license fees, yet did so anyway, and because Valley County would have 
obtained the fees but for McCone County, the Montana Supreme Court ordered 
full disgorgement from McCone County to Valley County.75 
In 1989, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized the State’s taxing power over a mining company’s on-
reservation activities.76 The Apache Tribe leased part of its reservation land to 
Cotton Petroleum (“Cotton”), a non-Indian mining company.77 Cotton paid 
severance taxes to both the State and the Apache for several years, but brought 
suit against New Mexico for injunctive relief in 1982.78 Cotton argued that the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (“IMLA”) was intended to maximize re-
turn to tribes from mining leases, in order to further broaden federal policies 
that encouraged tribal self-government and economic development.79 Both the 
New Mexico District Court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the 
State’s taxes.80 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court explained the 
standard for preemption in Indian law.81 The state may impose a tax on non-
Indian private parties with whom the tribe does business, unless Congress has 
acted to provide the tribe immunity.82 But distinct from other areas of the law, 
that analysis of congressional intent should be “flexible” and “particularized” 
given the historical precept of tribal sovereignty.83 Therefore, state law may be 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 365–66. 
 76 Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989). 
 77 Id. at 168. 
 78 Id. at 168, 170. The DOI approved the tribe’s severance tax in accordance with the tribe’s con-
stitution. Id. at 167–68. 
 79 Id. at 177. 
 80 Id. at 171. The New Mexico Supreme Court quashed a writ of certiorari, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted probable jurisdiction. Id. at 173. In addition to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (“IMLA”) 
preemption question, the United States Supreme Court invited the parties to argue whether under the 
Commerce Clause, Indian tribes should be treated as states to determine whether a state tax on non-
Indian activity on a reservation needs to take account of the taxes already imposed on the same activi-
ty by an Indian tribe. Id. 
 81 See id. at 173–77. 
 82 Id. at 175. The Court noted that this standard represented a change in the Court’s historical 
policy toward tribal preemption. See id. at 173–75. In the early twentieth century, the Court invalidat-
ed state taxes on tribal activities under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Id. at 173–74. The 
idea there was that a state tax on a party in contract with the federal government was a tax on the con-
tract, and so was a constitutionally prohibited tax on the federal government, because it inhibited the 
government’s ability to enter into a contract. Id. at 174. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 360–62 (1819) (declaring state taxes on the federal bank unconstitutional). 
 83 Cotton Petrol. Corp., 490 U.S. at 176; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (“This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state 
or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake . . . .”). 
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preempted based on Congress’s implied will, with the history of tribal sover-
eignty acting as a “necessary backdrop to that process.”84 
Because the text of the IMLA neither expressly permits nor precludes 
state taxes, the Supreme Court turned to the legislative history behind the IM-
LA in order to determine Congress’s intent.85 The Court found that the IMLA 
was designed to remove barriers in Indian mineral leasing not present in the 
non-Indian domain.86 The Court noted that while the purpose of the IMLA was 
“to provide Indian tribes with badly needed revenue,” Congress did not intend 
to “remove all barriers to profit maximization.”87 Therefore, the IMLA did not 
preempt New Mexico’s taxation of on-reservation mining activity.88 In a foot-
note, the Court explained that its decision was not inconsistent with its deci-
sion in Crow II.89 The Court explained that it had summarily affirmed preemp-
tion in Crow II because Montana’s “extraordinarily high” taxes negatively af-
fected the marketability of the Tribe’s coal, and so impaired the federal policy 
favoring the exploitation of Indian resources.90 By contrast, the Supreme Court 
found that New Mexico’s taxes would have only had a “marginal effect” on the 
Apache Tribe’s demand for leases and ability to increase its own tax rate.91 
Therefore the negative effects of Montana’s taxes in Crow II were more sub-
stantial than New Mexico’s taxes in Cotton Petroleum, and so New Mexico’s 
taxes did not impair federal policy.92 
III. ANALYSIS 
In 1998, in Crow Tribe v. Montana, the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the Tribe’s claim to full disgorgement of the pre-1983 taxes paid by 
Westmoreland to Montana.93 Instead, the majority should have awarded full 
disgorgement, or granted alternative relief through either partial disgorgement 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Cotton Petrol. Corp., 490 U.S. at 176–77. In other words, congressional intent sufficient for 
preemption need not be express. Id. 
 85 See id. at 177–80. The Court noted that the legislative history did not explicitly reflect on state 
taxation. Id. at 177–78. 
 86 Id. at 180. One such example was the lack of extralateral mineral rights on Indian lands. See id. 
Whereas in the public domain a discoverer of minerals could mine the ore indefinitely beyond the 
public land, on Indian territory a discoverer was limited to mining within certain confines. Id. at 178. 
 87 Id. at 178 To support the point that the IMLA guarantees Indian tribes the maximum profit 
available without regard to state interests, Cotton cited to the Secretary of the Interior’s letter of 
transmittal to describe the IMLA. Id. at 178–79. The Secretary’s letter contained the phrase, “[i]t is 
not believed that the present law is adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their proper-
ty.” Id. at 178–79. The Court refused to give the Secretary’s words “talismanic effect.” Id. at 179. 
 88 See id. at 180. 
 89 Id. at 186 n.17. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 186–87. 
 92 Id. at 186 n.17. 
 93 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians (Crow Tribe), 523 U.S. 696, 719 (1998). 
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or compensatory damages.94 Alternative relief would have furthered the federal 
policy of promoting tribal self-government and economic development.95 
The Court relied on Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico to distinguish 
the remedy in Valley County v. Thomas.96 The Tribe likened its claim to that 
made by Valley County in Thomas, citing to the Court’s invalidation of Mon-
tana’s taxes in Crow II, and arguing that Westmoreland had simply paid the 
“wrong sovereign,” and so all the pre-1983 taxes should be disgorged to the 
Tribe.97 The Court distinguished Thomas, explaining that Montana law permit-
ted one county to collect the fees at the exclusion of the other.98 Disgorgement 
was therefore appropriate in that case because while Valley County had the 
right to tax, McCone County had actually obtained the money.99 By contrast, 
Cotton Petroleum established that neither the State nor the Tribe could tax to 
the “total exclusion” of the other.100 And unlike Valley County, the Tribe never 
had the right to tax in the first place.101 The Court thus held that the Tribe’s 
request for full disgorgement based on Thomas did not follow as between the 
Tribe and Montana.102 
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Awarded Full Disgorgement 
The Supreme Court’s decision to deny full disgorgement of the pre-1983 
taxes was inconsistent with its earlier decision to give the post-1982 taxes to 
the Tribe.103 Because the Ninth Circuit granted declaratory and injunctive relief 
against Montana’s taxes in Crow II, the Tribe was accordingly awarded the full 
amount of the post-1982 taxes held in the District Court’s registry.104 The Su-
preme Court summarily affirmed that judgment and the corresponding reme-
dy.105 Later in Cotton Petroleum, the Supreme Court confirmed its summary 
affirmance of Crow II.106 Thus, in Crow IV, the Ninth Circuit found that Mon-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See id. at 720–21, 725 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 95 See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow II), 819 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 96 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 716. 
 97 See id. at 714. 
 98 Id. at 716. 
 99 See id at 715–16. 
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716. 
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 104 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 706–07; Crow II, 819 F.2d at 903. 
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 106 Cotton Petrol. Corp., 490 U.S. at 186 n.17. In a footnote, the Court said, “We . . . have no 
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tana’s arguments for denying the Tribe the pre-1983 taxes were essentially the 
same as its arguments in the litigation over the post-1982 taxes, and so had 
already been “rejected explicitly or rendered irrelevant by this court’s previous 
decisions.”107  
Rather than granting the Tribe the pre-1983 taxes, consistent with its 
summary affirmance of the Tribe’s right to the post-1982 taxes, the Supreme 
Court implied that the Tribe had already been adequately compensated by the 
post-1982 taxes, and therefore did not deserve the pre-1983 taxes.108 By deny-
ing the Tribe full disgorgement, the Court exercised contradictory discretion, 
and allowed Montana to retain taxes that the state legislature had always 
known were potentially illegal.109 The Court should have instead fully dis-
gorged the pre-1983 taxes to the Tribe, consistent with its prior decision.110 
B. The Supreme Court Could Have Alternatively Awarded  
Partial Disgorgement 
Even if the Supreme Court had denied the Tribe full disgorgement, the 
Court could have alternatively awarded partial disgorgement.111 Because Mon-
tana had no right to tax at an “extraordinarily high” rate, and because the De-
partment of the Interior (“DOI”) erred in denying the Tribe the right to tax, the 
Court could have awarded partial disgorgement of the excess taxes.112 To be 
sure, Cotton Petroleum allowed the State the right to tax on-reservation activi-
ties.113 But as Justice Souter explained in his concurrence, that principle only 
applied to a certain “economic point,” which Montana exceeded by imposing 
excessively high taxes.114 The excess taxes collected by Montana were there-
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow IV), 92 F.3d 826, 830 (1996); see supra notes 
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fore as illegally exacted as the licensing fees ordered disgorged in Thomas.115 
That prohibited portion of taxes collected by Montana could have been award-
ed to the Tribe as a partial disgorgement.116 
The Court further could have found that the Tribe was entitled to collect 
taxes from Westmoreland, despite the DOI’s ostensible disapproval.117 In both 
Crow I and Crow II, the Ninth Circuit found that the minerals underneath the 
Strip were a “component of the reservation land itself.”118 Based on these find-
ings, the District Court remarked that the DOI’s rejection of the Tribe’s pro-
posed tax was mistaken.119 Although the DOI intended for the Tribe’s tax to 
apply to on-reservation activities not including the Strip, the District Court 
found that the DOI’s approval actually applied to the Strip given the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s findings.120 Although the Supreme Court treated this finding as immate-
rial, given that the Tribe did not receive explicit approval from the DOI, the 
Court could have allowed the Tribe to proceed as a rightful taxing authority 
similar to Valley County in Thomas.121 One of the primary purposes behind the 
IMLA was to remove technical requirements and complicated procedures that 
prevented tribes from leasing their land.122 By treating as dicta the lower courts’ 
finding that the DOI should have granted the Tribe the right to tax, the Supreme 
Court betrayed Congress’s intent.123 If the Court had both recognized that Mon-
tana was not allowed to tax beyond a certain economic point, and that the Tribe 
should have had the right to tax, the Court could have awarded the Tribe partial 
disgorgement of the excess taxes in line with prior case precedent.124 
C. The Supreme Court Could Have Alternatively Remanded to 
 Determine Compensatory Damages 
Even if the Supreme Court did not find any disgorgement appropriate, it 
could have alternatively remanded the case for a factual determination of com-
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pensatory damages due to the Tribe.125 The Court’s based its decision to deny 
compensatory damages entirely on the testimony of Westmoreland’s president, 
who claimed that no contracts were lost during the relevant time period due to 
the State’s taxes.126 Yet the Ninth Circuit had repeatedly held that Montana’s 
taxes increased the cost of coal production, and so forced the coal producers to 
pass higher costs onto purchasers, which resulted in fewer sales and so fewer 
royalties for the Tribe.127 Therefore apart from the disgorgement claim, there 
was enough evidence to at least raise the question as to whether the Tribe had 
suffered injury due to Montana’s taxes.128 The Supreme Court should have re-
manded for a more comprehensive determination by the District Court.129 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Tribe secured the post-1982 taxes paid by Westmoreland in-
to the District Court’s registry, the United States Supreme Court denied any 
relief to the Tribe for the taxes improperly collected by Montana between 1976 
and 1982. During the course of litigation, the Tribe secured a judgment that 
federal law preempted Montana’s taxes. Further, the District Court and Ninth 
Circuit recognized that the DOI erred in denying the Tribe’s tax on the Strip, 
invoking the strength of federal policy favoring tribal self-government and 
economic development. After almost twenty years of contentious litigation, the 
United States Supreme Court improperly, and in conflict with their own prece-
dent, denied the Tribe any relief whatsoever. The Court could have, and should 
have, found for the Tribe under Thomas, in spite of the precedent set by Cotton 
Petroleum. Relief for the Tribe would have served to ameliorate the on-
reservation poverty, reduce bureaucratic impediments to tribal autonomy, and 
deny Montana the benefit of illegal taxation. 
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